Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott

72. Testimony of Special Counsel Jack A. Blum, Senate Intelligence Hearing on Drug Trafficking and the Contra War, October 23, 1996; Washington Weekly, October 28, 1996.

73. Mike Levine, The Big White Lie (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1993), 35–36.

74. Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 46; Marshall et al., The Iran-Contra Connection, 20–25; Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 19, 247.

75. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, 59–60. Through the Guérinis of the Corsican Mafia, Brown also made “contact with the mafia in Italy” (Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 112). Valentine confirms allegations that Brown himself came under FBN investigation in the 1960s because of his unexplained travels in the company of Corsican drug trafficker Maurice Castellani (362–63, cf. 270–74); see also Douglas Valentine, “The French Connection Revisited: The CIA, Irving Brown, and Drug Smuggling as Political Warfare,” Covert Action, http://www.covertaction.org/content/view/99/75.

76. Charbonneau, The Canadian Connection, 69, 75; Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 328, 331.

77. Charbonneau, The Canadian Connection, 209.

78. Proceso, August 5, 1985, 30; Peter Lupsha, “Drug Lords and Narco-Corruption,” in McCoy and Block, War on Drugs, 180. Chavarri was described by Lupsha as a founder of the DFS. But La Charola (65–66) gives a list of the founding officers; there is a Fernando Rocha Chavarri but no Rafael Chavarri.

79. Gaia Servadio, Mafioso (New York: Dell, 1976), 125–28; Scott, Deep Politics, 174.

80. Scott, Deep Politics, 174.

81. Scott, Deep Politics, 174–77.

82. Wikipedia, “Sylvestro Carolla,” citing Jay Robert Nash, The Encyclopedia of World Crime (Wilmette, IL: CrimeBooks Inc., 1990), vol. 1 (A–C).

83. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 39 (Lebanon), 162ss (Thailand), 197 (Vietnam), and 476–77 (Pakistan); Jeffrey M. Bale, “The ‘Black’ Terrorist International: Neo-Fascist Paramilitary Networks and the ‘Strategy of Tension’ in Italy, 1968–1974” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), 170 (Italy); Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish Is Red (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 314 (Cuba); Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 240–43 (Turkey). Ganser also presents evidence of a CIA–drugs triarchy involving Spanish intelligence (106–7) and the French Secret Army Organization or OAS (100). By the 1980s such triarchic arrangements were widespread in Latin America (Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, vii–xii, 79–85).

84. Alan A. Block and Constance A. Weaver, All Is Clouded by Desire: Global Banking, Money Laundering, and International Organized Crime (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 28.

85. Joseph. J. Trento, Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America’s Private Intelligence Network (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2005), 1. I have not found documentation for this claim. The closest might be Dulles’ overseas work in 1949 as legal adviser to Overseas Consultants, Inc., whose “most promising venture was the design of a long-range development program [for] Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, shah of Iran” (Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles [Boston: Richard Todd/Houghton Mifflin, 1994], 295).

86. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Books, 1982), 821–22.

87. Quoted in Mark Riebling, Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA (New York: Knopf, 1994), 97–98.

88. Riebling, Wedge, 98.

89. William Stevenson, The Revolutionary King: The True-Life Sequel to The King and I (London: Constable and Robinson, 2001), 4.

90. Brown, The Last Hero, 796.

91. Brown, The Last Hero, 795–800.

92. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 509–12; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 109–10, 197.

93. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 511; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 109–10, 197. Satiris “Sonny” Fassoulis, accused of passing bribes as the vice president of Commerce International, was under indictment ten years later when he surfaced in the syndicate-linked Guterma scandals.

94. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 511. As we shall see in the next chapter, suspicions that CIA uses CI(C) persist to this day (Paul Collin, “Global Economic Brinkmanship,” http://www.totse.com/en/politics/corporatarchy/Valentine,globaleconomic170320.html).

95. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 513; cf. William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 102.

96. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 109–10, 197; New York Times, May 23, 1950, 34.

97. Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, xx; Scott, The Road to 9/11, 267–69. As noted earlier, the increasingly common usage of both terms has blurred this distinction.

98. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 8, 1989.

99. Washington Post, February 6, 1989.

100. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 37, cf. 41–42.

101. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 41–42 and passim, quoting Newsweek, May 13, 1985.

102. Lupsha, “Drug Lords and Narco-Corruption,” 185–87.

103. Peter Lupsha, “Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico,” excerpted from Peter Lupsha, “Under the Volcano: Narco Investment in Mexico,” Transnational Organized Crime Journal, Spring 1995, posted originally on the Web by PBS, Frontline, April 8, 1997, http://www.eco.utexas.edu/~archive/chiapas95/1997.04/msg00066.html.

104. Elaine Shannon, Desperados (New York: Viking, 1988), 67, quoted in Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, 38–39.

105. Jorge Castañeda, The Mexican Shock: Its Meaning for the United States (New York: New Press, 1995), 222.

106. Castañeda, The Mexican Shock, 215; New York Times, July 20, 1996.

107. Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 78.

108. Castañeda, The Mexican Shock, 37.

109. Anthony DePalma, “Gap between Mexico’s Rich and Poor Is Widening,” New York Times, July 20, 1996: “Today the richest 10 percent of Mexicans control 41 percent of the country’s wealth, while the bottom half of the population receives